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if ISSUES 
Does the State o^ . * -*> p low the legal or technica I meaning 
of "conviction" whereby a individual is only convicted once final 
j udgrnent \ r»n t eir ed" 
If the State of Utah does not, follow the lega' or" technical 
meaning of "conviction" should a conviction In-* overtui nei whet e 
ther e ar e prejudicial proceedings and where it would be offensive 
to the pub11c sense of fa i r ness and j ustice? 
i i i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Appellant claimed that an 11 month 
delay in sentencing due to a circuit court clerical error was an 
unconscionable delay and that sentencing after that length of 
time would be prejudicial to the appellant. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, After 11 
months, or 313 days, after Appellant's arraignment the Layton 
Circuit Court discovered their error and served notice upon 
Appellant to appear for sentencing on January 9, 1990. 
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss on January 22, 1990 
based on the unreasonable time the court had delayed now 
prejudiced appellant's job. 
Judge K. Roger Bean denied the motion to dismiss on April 
26, 1990. 
On appeal this court held the delay to be unjustified and 
found for appellant. Respondent filed a petition for rehearing 
September 25, 1990. 
C. Statement of Facts. On February 4, 1989 defendant, 
Clayton Aaron ("Aaron"), was arrested and charged with, (1) 
driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) driving too fast for 
existing conditions; (3) improper registration; and, (4) 
accident city code. 
Aaron was arraigned February 14, 1989, where he pled no 
contest to charges 1 and 3 but pled not guilty on charges 2 and 
TV 
4. At that time trial was scheduled on charges 2 and 4 for March 
3, 1989, sentencing on charges 1 and 3 delayed until the trial. 
Aaron appeared as ordered on March 3, 1989, for trial and 
sentencing but was told by the clerk of the court trial had been 
cancelled. Aaron showed the clerk his notice to appear which was 
countered by the computer printout of the court showing that the 
proceedings had been dismissed. 
Aaron did not hear further from the court until notice to 
appear for sentencing on January 9, 1990. In the interim, Aaron 
received a change in work assignment at Hill Air Force Base which 
required him to travel to other Air Force Logistics Bases as an 
inspector, and also required he have a valid civilian drivers 
license to operate civilian and military vehicles. 
Following the course and proceedings stated above Aaron was 
discharged from the sentence and this court reversed Defendant's 
conviction on charges 1 and 3. Respondent now appeals claiming 
this court had no power to reverse Aaron's conviction and 
therefore the conviction should be on Aaron's record. 
v 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMEENT 
The legal definition of "conviction" implies final judgment 
upon the defendant. Since the trial court is precluded from its 
final judgment by its own error and this court's decision, Aaron 
has not been legally "convicted." The trial court should not be 
allowed a quasi-final conviction by allowing them to record a 
conviction as a matter of public policy since people would be 
unable to reasonably rely on the statements of the court and 
further prejudicial harm could result, 
vi 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT WAS NOT LEGALLY CONVICTED AND 
THE TRAIL COURT CANNOT BE ALLOWED A QUASI-CONVICTION 
DUE TO PUBLIC POLICY AND LONG TERM PREJUDICE 
TO THE APPELLANT. 
Aaron was not convicted by the legal definition and should 
therefore not be subject to having a "conviction" on his 
permanent record because it is against public policy to have 
unreliable courts and since Aaron still has the potential of 
prejudice. Since the trial court was precluded from "convicting" 
Aaron by their own error they should not be allowed a quasi-
conviction, or the consequential results of a conviction at some 
far later date. 
Aaron was not "convicted" in the legal definition of the 
term. American Jurisprudence defines conviction in the following 
manner: 
"The word 'conviction' has two meanings: its 
ordinary or popular meaning, which refers to the 
finding of guilt by plea or verdict, and its legal or 
technical meaning, which refers to the final judgment 
entered on plea or verdict of guilty. . .[and] is not a 
conviction until the judgment has been entered. . 
,[W]here legal disabilities, disqualifications, and 
forfeitures are to follow, the strict legal meaning is 
to be applled." 
21A Am Jur Criminal Law sec. 1024. 
Several states have followed the American Jurisprudence 
distinction recognizing that even though a verdict of a plea of 
guilty, in Aaron's case nolo contendre, is entered the defendant 
is not actually convicted until there is a sentencing. In Levin 
v. Carpenter. 332 SW2d 862 (Mo. 1960), the Missouri Supreme Court 
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held, " '[T]he word "convicted" includes the final judgment, and 
that one who has been found guilty by the jury, but has not yet 
been sentenced is not a "convicted" person.'" Id. at 865 
(quoting Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 SW2d 502)(emphasis 
added). Since sentencing has been precluded in Aaron's case by 
this courts decision there can be no conviction. 
In Heartsill v. County Election Board of Carter County. 326 
P.2d 782 (Okla 1958), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where 
there was a conviction but no judgment on a felony the strict 
meaning of "conviction" should be used and the defendant could 
not be kept from voting until the strict meaning was fulfilled. 
The Court said, "[Tjhe meaning of the term 'adjudged guilty' 
imports a final judgment of 'condemnation of law.'" id- at 786. 
Finally, in a Utah case, Little v. Mitchel1, 604 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the distinction 
between an order and a final judgment in a case of multiple 
claims. The Utah Supreme Court said, "This does not necessarily 
mean that there is a final judgment merely because the order so 
recites." id. at 919. Thus, even where a court signs a order 
proclaiming final judgment there can be a final judgment in form 
and one "in fact." id. at 919. 
In Aaron's case the strict, legal definition of "conviction" 
should be used. Since Aaron has not been convicted using the 
legal definition of the word because he is precluded from being 
sentenced by this court's decision. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized a distinction between a final judgment in fact and one 
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in form alone. Aaron's case had neither fact or form. 
Allowing the trial court to put a conviction on Aaron's 
record allows the form of conviction where there has been none in 
fact. It allows the trial court the all of the consequences of a 
conviction except the actual sentence when the defendant was 
never actually legally "convicted." 
Second, public policy requires that those having business 
with the court be able to rely on the accuracy of the court's 
statements. The court cannot be allowed to err to the prejudice 
of another and still receive the benefits of that error. 
Granting Layton City's petition would allow some of the benefits 
of their error, a recorded conviction, where the defendant relied 
on the court's accuracy. There is a fundamental injustice in 
allowing a conviction when the court-earlier claimed there was 
none to be had. The public should be able to rely on the 
accuracy of the court and when a court is inaccurate it should 
inure to the benefit of the defendant. 
Third, if this court grants Layton City's petition Aaron 
will be prejudiced. Although not to the same degree as a 
sentence would impose, Aaron would be prejudiced by a conviction 
on his record. A conviction on his record may influence his 
employment as well as future opportunities within his current job 
and even affect his ability to be considered for advancement. 
While it is true that the effect of a conviction ought to be 
considered before the act is done, in this case, there was no 
conviction to be had in the trial court and their error should 
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not be allowed to haunt the defendant or his future employment. 
IF THE THIS COURT FINDS THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED 
THE ACTUAL CONVICTION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
DUE TO THE RESPONDENT'S ERRORS. 
In the alternative of point one, if this court finds that 
Aaron was convicted or chooses to use the layman's definition of 
"conviction," this court should maintain its position that the 
conviction is overturned. Fairness and justice requires that in 
this narrow field of cases where the court's delay prejudices the 
defendant the conviction and the sentence should be void. 
In Hicklin v. State 535 P.2d 741 (Wy. 1975), the Wyoming 
Supreme Court said, "A Judgment in a criminal case will not be 
disturbed by reason of sentencing procedures unless there is a 
showing of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial 
to defendant, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness 
and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play." Xd. at 743. In Hick!i n the court found no such error. 
In Aaron's case all of there errors occurred and should be 
the basis for overturning his conviction. The court abused it's 
sentencing discretion by the unconscionable length of delay in 
sentencing. The procedure was found prejudicial by the court on 
-appeal. And, the circumstance definitely show and inherent 
unfairness and injustice which ought, if it does not, offend 
anyone's sense of fair play. 
Aaron's conviction should, therefore, be overturned along 
with the discharge of his sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aaron was never convicted in the legal or technical meaning 
of the word. A conviction requires a sentencing or final 
judgment which the trial court is precluded from determining due 
to their own error. Allowing a conviction on Aaron's record 
would provide Layton City with the benefits of a conviction 
without a conviction in fact. Second, by public policy errors of 
the court should inure to the benefit of the defendant since the 
defendant should be able to rely on reasonable accuracy from the 
court. Third, albeit at a lesser degree, Aaron would still be 
prejudiced by a conviction on his record. Finally, in the 
alternative, the this court chooses to follow the layman's 
definition of conviction, Aaron's conviction should still be 
overturned due to the prejudice to the defendant and the offense 
to the public's sense of fairness and justice. 
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